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Abstract: Secure land tenure is important to the development process, but
China’s rural reforms have so far failed to provide farm households with this
security. We examine the political economy of land tenure and ﬁnd that local
governments sacriﬁce tenure security in the interests of efﬁciency and equity.
Local rent seeking also plays an important role, and is a likely source of the
under-development of land rental markets. Our results further suggest that
decreases in distortionary taxes and increases in the integrity of elections will
lead to more secure tenure and an increased reliance on market land exchange.
(JEL: R52, Q13.)
1. Introduction
A cornerstone of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy is the
establishment of a well-deﬁned system of property rights. China’s agricultural sector
began this transition in the early 1980’s when the Household Responsibility System (HRS)
dismantled China’s collectives and granted households use rights to the land in return for
meeting tax and quota obligations. The reforms, however, have not produced the right to
secure tenure. Two decades after the implementation of HRS, land tenure remains insecure
in a majority of villages and land rental markets are thin, if they operate at all. The cause of
the insecurity is clear: Local governments routinely conﬁscate land from some households
inthevillageandredistributeittoothers. Thereasonlandrentalmarketshavenotevolved
is less obvious.
In order to understand the determinants of tenure security in rural China, we analyze
land reallocation behavior of local governments using data collected for this purpose.
The importance of this analysis for Chinese agricultural policy is clear. Since local gov-
ernments commonly inﬂuence property rights in developing and transition economies
(e.g. BOYCKO, SHLIEFER, and VISHNY [1995], ALSTON, LIBECAP, AND BERNARDO [1997],
LIBECAP [1979]), ouranalysisoffersinsightintoanissuefundamentaltoanunderstanding
of these economies: The political economy of property rights formation.
We ﬁnd that local governments reallocate land for a variety of reasons. Much of this
reallocation behavior can be explained by an efﬁciency hypothesis. In the context of a rural
economy where land rental markets and on-farm labor markets are largely missing, local
governments use reallocations to move land from lower to higher valued uses, and to help
reduce the excess burden of land taxes. The costs associated with these allocations, in turn,
inﬂuence both their size and frequency.1 We also ﬁnd a link between land reallocation
1These costs include the transactions costs associated with the reallocation itself, and dynamic incentive
costs related to the effect of tenure insecurity on investment. For reasons explained below, in the paper we
focus primarily on the former.
1behavior and concerns for equity. In some cases, local governments use reallocations to
equalize household access to land. The equity motive, however, appears to be much less
important empirically than efﬁciency. Finally, despite the role we ascribe to efﬁciency
considerations, we ﬁnd preliminary evidence that rent-seeking behavior by local leaders
underlies both the failure of land markets to develop and, the persistence of administrat-
ive reallocation in an increasingly marketized economy.
Our results have important policy implications. Lower taxes on land or measures that
reduce the effort required by local leaders to enforce the collection of land taxes will
help foster more secure land tenure and encourage the emergence of land rental markets.
Our results also suggest that reforms which increase the ability of villagers to remove
narrowly self-interested leaders from ofﬁce improve land rights and rental markets. Since
administrative reallocations leave signiﬁcant gains from trade unexploited [BENJAMIN
AND BRANDT, 2002], measures that reduce the need for land allocations, increase tenure
security and allow land rental markets to transfer land among individuals, likely will
produce important welfare gains.
2. Institutional Background
TwentyyearsofeconomicreforminruralChinahaveproducedasysteminwhichfarming
is jointly conducted by farmers and local leaders [PUTTERMAN, 1993]. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the Household Responsibility System dismantled agricultural collectives
and allocated farmland to households. After paying local taxes and meeting a mandatory
delivery quota (which typically involves selling a ﬁxed amount of grain or cash crop at a
below-market price to the state procurement system), households were entitled to the rest
of the income that they produced on their land. Reformers did not privatize land however,
but instead gave ownership rights to the collective (or, as we henceforth call it, the village).
Using their authority over land, one of a local leader’s principal responsibilities was to
allocate cultivated land to households. Although most farmers have well-deﬁned income
and control rights, in some villages a leader retains control over crop choice and the
decision to rent land to other households [ROZELLE, 1994].
In most villages, village land management is conducted by one or more members of
the village executive committee. The main actors in this executive committee are typically
the party secretary and the village head. The party secretary is selected by higher-level
party organizations.2 The village head, on the other hand, may be appointed by township
government ofﬁcials, elected by villagers in a formal election process, or selected by a vil-
lage representative assembly [O‘BRIEN AND LI, 1999; PASTOR AND TAN, 2000]. Although
the division of administrative responsibility between the party secretary and the village
head is not always well-deﬁned, higher levels of government evaluate them both on the
basis of their success in meeting targets set by higher levels of government for family
planning, quota fulﬁllment, tax collection and maintaining farm output [WHITING, 1996].
Performance contracts tie their wages and promotion explicitly to meeting these targets
2In China, the lowest three levels of the government hierarchy in descending order are the county,
township and village. A county consists of approximately 10 to 15 townships. A township consists of 10 to
15 villages. During our study period, township party ofﬁcials typically appointed village party secretaries.
Occasionally, however, county party ofﬁcials appointed them.
2and to other economic and social variables like village economic growth and equity [HO,
1994; ROZELLE, 1994; O‘BRIEN AND LI, 1999].
Local leaders also are accountable to villagers [O‘BRIEN AND LI, 1999]. Leaders are
subject to direct lobbying by the villagers. Villagers also indirectly inﬂuence local leader
decisions by lobbying township leaders, who in turn, can pressure local leaders. Finally
election laws in some communities affect the decisions of local leaders who increasingly
must stand for competitive elections.
Although local leaders have considerable discretion, upper-level government ofﬁcials
often try to dictate policy, in particular the manner in which cultivated land is to be man-
aged.3 For example, in the initial State Council documents codifying HRS, the collective
was supposed to allocate land to farmers for 15 years. In 1999, a new land law set a new
contracting period for 30 years. Almost everyone in China’s government knows these
rules, from those in the Ministry of Agriculture to the local leaders of China’s most remote
villages. These policies, however, have not been followed.
Table 1 about here
Tenure security is largely determined by the frequency and magnitude of village-wide
land reallocations. In these reallocations, all or part of the land is taken back from house-
holds and re-divided among existing and new households in the village. According to
our data, in more than two-thirds of villages, local leaders have reallocated land among
households at least once (Table 1).4 Conditional on reallocation, the average number of
administrative reallocations between 1982 and 1995 is 2.3. Data on the percentage of
land that local leaders have reallocated since the advent of the reforms demonstrate that
slightlymorethanhalfofallfarmlandhaschangedhandsatleastonce. Ontheotherhand,
based on data for the most recent reallocations in these villages, we ﬁnd that a typical
reallocation involves two-thirds of a village’s land and three-quarters of its households.
Land in rural China can also move among households in rental transactions. Although
70 percent of surveyed villages report that households enjoy unencumbered rights to rent
land in 1995, the land rental market is thin (Table 2). Despite doubling since 1988, in 1995
China’s farmers still rented out less than three percent of the land that they cultivated.
The market for agricultural labor is equally thin. Only half of all villages report the use of
hired farm labor in 1995, up from one quarter in 1988. Our estimates suggest that farmers
in China hire less than one percent of their agricultural labor.5
Table 2 about here
While the markets for land rental and farm labor are poorly developed, the market
for non-farm labor has boomed. Our data show that employment in local village and
3There is currently considerable debate about how much latitude local ofﬁcials should have over land.
Currentregulationsprohibitlargerreallocationsandonlyallowleaderstomakesmalladjustmentstobeneﬁt
the community.
4These data are discussed more fully in Section 4.
5In 1988, the number of individuals hired per village was less than 10, and in 1995 only 25. Household
level data suggest that individuals worked on average 75 days per year in farming, implying that only about
one-half of one percent of farm labor was hired in 1995.
3township-run enterprises, family businesses, and long-term employment outside the vil-
lage doubled between 1988 and 1995, even though the labor force grew only modestly.
By 1995, between 35 and 40 percent of the local labor force was employed outside of
agriculture either full or part time, a level consistent with that reported at the national
level [STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA, 1996].
In return for use-rights to the land, in much of China village leaders assign quotas
to farming households, typically on the basis of family size, allocated land, or some
combination of the two. These quotas are a vestige of the pre-reform period and entail
the delivery of grain, cotton, and/or oil crops to the state at predetermined prices that can
be as low as 50 percent of free-market prices [SICULAR, 1995]. With HRS, responsibility
for quota delivery shifted to households. However, even after the reforms upper-level
ofﬁcials still hold local leaders responsible for ensuring that households fulﬁll quotas
[ROZELLE, 1994; AND OI, 1989].6
In absolute terms, village quotas remained fairly constant from the early 1980s until the
mid 1990s. On average, quotas account for slightly less than 10 percent of village crop
output. The implicit tax associated with one unit of the quota is equal to the difference
between the market and quota prices for a unit of output. If we subtract non-labor input
expenditures from the measure of the quota’s gross cash obligation, the implicit value of
the quota in 1995 was 15 percent of the village’s net income from cropping.
Historically, upper-level ofﬁcials required farmers to fulﬁll their quota in kind, how-
ever, in a growing number of villages farmers are given the option to fulﬁll their quota
with a cash payment. Such a cash payment is equal to the difference between the market
and quota prices, multiplied by the volume of the household’s quota. According to our
data, in the 1980s only 30 percent of all villages allowed farmers to use cash to fulﬁll their
quotas. Within these villages, only 12 percent of households exercised this option. In
contrast, by 1995, 59 percent of all villages allowed cash to be used to fulﬁll grain quotas.
In these villages, 27 percent of households chose to use cash to fulﬁll their grain quota.
3. Explanations for Reallocation Behavior
To investigate the determinants of village reallocations, and hence tenure security, we ﬁrst
require a model of local government behavior. We use the canonical model of government
developed by OLSON [1971], STIGLER [1971] and BECKER [1985], among others. This
model assumes that the actions of a government reﬂect the objectives of interested parties
and their respective abilities to inﬂuence the collective choice process.
Given this model, we propose three hypotheses about how local governments behave
in rural China. We refer to these as the Efﬁciency Hypothesis, the Equity Hypothesis and
the Rent-seeking Hypothesis. A test of any one of these hypotheses is, effectively, a test
of the hypothesis that some inﬂuential interest group or coalition within the body politic
is sufﬁciently interested in having the government act in a particular way. In our setting,
interested parties include village leaders, households, and possibly higher-level author-
ities. This analytical framework is useful since it allows us to investigate the economic
6The quotas were temporarily eliminated in 1993 and then re-instated the following year. By the late
1990s, a modest subsidy rather than a tax was associated with the quotas as farmers were paid prices higher
than those prevailing in the market. If China’s domestic agricultural prices were to rise again, the implicit
tax might reappear.
4factors which affect a local government’s behavior and lead to secure or insecure tenure.
Unfortunately, data limitations require that the actual decision-making process remain a
black box. With few exceptions, we can only conjecture about the identity of individuals
who provide the impetus for observed land reallocations.
A. Efﬁciency hypothesis
The Efﬁciency Hypothesis posits that land reallocations are carried out to maximize the
discounted present value of agricultural proﬁts in an environment in which farm labor
and land rental markets are largely missing. In particular, administrative reallocations
exploit gains from land exchange by moving land to higher valued uses. It is important
to keep in mind that the Efﬁciency Hypothesis does not imply that administrative realloc-
ations are as good as or better than markets at allocating land efﬁciently. On the contrary,
our expectation is that there will typically be less unexploited gains from trade when land
rentalmarketsoperatethanwhenlandexchangeisconductedadministratively.7 Webegin
by examining the a priori basis for the Efﬁciency Hypothesis. We then discuss tests of this
hypothesis based on the relationship between village reallocation behavior and two likely
precursors to inefﬁcient land allocation: changes in household demographics and labor
supply; and high levels of agricultural quota.
First, if reallocations occur for efﬁciency reasons, land rental markets and on-farm
labor markets must operate poorly enough so that most of the gains from shifting land
among households remain unexploited. As discussed above, this seems to be a reasonable
assumption. Only a small fraction of China’s land is being rented and an even smaller
fraction of on-farm labor is being hired as late as the mid-1990s.
Second, following the models of government behavior developed by OLSON [1971],
STIGLER [1971], and BECKER [1985], there must be some inﬂuential coalition within the
body politic that will beneﬁt from the increase in agricultural income that is generated
when land reallocations make agriculture more efﬁcient. This seems likely. We expect
households that value land more highly to lobby for favorable reallocations.8 Moreover,
local leaders may favor land reallocations for efﬁciency reasons. Efﬁciency-enhancing
reallocations that increase farm proﬁts will likely make it easier for them to collect taxes
and ensure that farmers fulﬁll their delivery quota. Since fulﬁlling the village’s quota
obligation and promoting the growth of farm output and rural incomes are important
parts of a leader’s responsibilities and are linked to his bonus and promotion, a leader has
an incentive to take actions to improve the efﬁciency of land allocation through periodic
reallocations.
Finally, the Efﬁciency Hypothesis requires that the village-wide reallocation of land be
costly. Although reallocations typically occur in the off-season, they often involve several
months of administrative work. Conversations with local leaders and farmers suggest
that the local leader must spend many days updating information on land use, household
demographics and labor supply. Additional time is needed to discuss the new allocation
schemes with farmers. Since reallocations often involve shifting more than one plot for
7Using household level data, BENJAMIN and BRANDT [2002], ﬁnd that, although reallocations help to
improve efﬁciency, the effect is marginal, and there remains signiﬁcant inefﬁciency in the allocation of land
across households within a village.
8This may occur informally, or more formally through the process of nominating and selecting like-
minded village leaders.
5each farm household in the village, redeﬁning and documenting plot boundaries also is
time-consuming.
a. Efﬁciency Hypothesis: Demographic and Labor Supply Changes
At the inception of the HRS, land was usually allocated to village households on the basis
of household size, possibly adjusting for the demographic composition of a household
[KUNG, 1995]. In the early 1980s, few households had members working off the farm
in non-agriculture and most family labor was directed to agriculture. Therefore, these
“per capita” allocation rules, in addition to being easy to implement, were probably also
efﬁcient: in an economy where households can only farm, allocating land on a per capita
basis would lead to a land allocation where the labor supply per unit of land, and hence
the marginal productivity of land, is nearly constant across households.
After this initial allocation, increasing participation in the off-farm labor market,
changes in household demographic structure, and household division gave rise to dif-
ferences among households in the amount of labor that they supplied to farming. If the
initial land allocations did not change, villages would experience increasing heterogeneity
in household labor to land ratios, and thus rising inefﬁciency. Although well-developed
land rental and on-farm labor markets could help eliminate these differences and ensure
that the land was efﬁciently allocated across households, these markets are largely absent.
Reallocations that move land from lower to higher valued uses can help to eliminate this
inefﬁciency.
In the appendix, we develop a dynamic model of land reallocation to examine the
optimal timing and size of reallocations. Here, we provide the basic intuition, and a set of
hypotheses.
Assume initially that land and labor are perfectly matched in the village so that the
marginal product of land is equalized throughout the village, and agricultural proﬁts are
maximized. Over time, differences in the marginal productivity of land emerge across
farm households as a result of changes in the amount of household labor supplied to
agriculture. The amount of land that must be reallocated to correct this inefﬁciency
depends on a number of factors. The shape of the agricultural production function is
important because it determines how sensitive the marginal product of labor is to changes
in land holdings. The rate of change in household demographics and labor supply is also
important, since the marginal product of labor depends on the amount of labor supplied.
Finally, the interaction between changes in labor supply and the shape of the agricultural
technology is also important: The amount of land reallocated to adjust a household’s
marginal product of labor depends on the product of the size of the household labor
supply change, and the sensitivity of marginal product of labor to such changes.
However, even if the only motivation for reallocations is to maximize agricultural
proﬁts, as long as there are ﬁxed costs of reallocating land, maintaining a "perfect" match
between land and labor by reallocating land annually would not necessarily maximize
village proﬁts. Instead, villages would reallocate land only when the inefﬁciencies (and
thus, potential gains) arising from the current allocation of land are large enough to offset
the costs. For any given initial state of the land-labor match, the village chooses the time
until the next reallocation, and the amount of land reallocated at the next reallocation. Op-
timal reallocation behavior maximizes the discounted present value of the present cycle’s
6proﬁts, conditional on optimizing behavior thereafter.9 Hence, if leaders are reallocating
land for efﬁciency reasons, our ﬁrst testable hypothesis is that administrative reallocations
will be large and infrequent (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 1). As Table 1 shows, this prediction is
borne out by the data.
The Efﬁciency Hypothesis makes other predictions as well. Along the efﬁcient real-
location path, the time since the last reallocation or, the duration of a reallocation period
will depend upon: ﬁxed and variable costs of reallocation (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 2); the
rate at which households’ agricultural labor supplies change (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 3);
characteristics of the agricultural technology (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 4); and the interaction
between the rate of change of agricultural labor supply and agricultural farm technology
(Efﬁciency Hypothesis 5). Finally, the formal analysis establishes that the amount of land
reallocated at any given reallocation depends upon: All of the same factors as the duration
of the reallocation period, except the ﬁxed costs of reallocation (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 6);
andthetimesincethelastreallocationorthedurationofthereallocationperiod(Efﬁciency
Hypothesis 7).
The cost of investment foregone because of insecure tenure is an important aspect
of the land reallocation process, and one that is conspicuously absent from the analysis
above. To the extent that dynamic efﬁciency also determines land reallocation behavior,
our analysis will understate the importance of efﬁciency as a determinant of local gov-
ernment behavior. Unfortunately, our data on land investment allow us to test only very
basic hypotheses about the relationship between investment and reallocation behavior. 10
Moreover, including investment in the formal analysis complicates notation and expos-
ition considerably. Since we already know that tenure insecurity reduces the incentives
for investment, we omit an analysis of the relationship between tenure insecurity and
investment in the interests of a simpler and more transparent theoretical analysis.
b. Efﬁciency Hypothesis: Reallocations and Quotas
Oneofavillageleader‘sprimaryresponsibilitiesisensuringtaxandquotafulﬁllment. The
relationship between quotas and reallocation has been widely discussed in the literature.
KELLIHER [1997] and ROZELLE AND LI[1998] argue that leaders use their discretion over
land allocation to expropriate land from villagers who do not fulﬁll quota obligations, and
that village reallocations are driven by such expropriation.
Three facts weigh against this story. First, our data indicate that in a typical year the
rate of default on quotas is probably near one percent. Given such a low rate of default
it is difﬁcult to imagine that leaders reallocate 60 percent of the land every six years as a
response to non-payment of quotas. Second, if reallocation behavior is motivated by the
need to punish acts of default, we expect to see reallocations occurring fairly continuously
and to involve a small number of households. In fact, we observe large and infrequent
reallocations. Third, in a recently completed household level survey, the authors asked
1200 households whether they had ever lost land in a reallocation as punishment for non-
payment of taxes. There were no positive responses.
9 A cycle is deﬁned to be the period between reallocations.
10In order to investigate cross-sectional differences in the dynamic costs of tenure insecurity, we require
data on variables that measure the stock of investment in land at risk when tenure is insecure, or data
capturing future returns to new investment in land. Variables capturing investment at risk include acreage
in paddy, orchards, or terraces. Variables capturing future returns are much harder to come up with.
7There is, however, an alternative explanation for the role of quotas in determining land
reallocation. This explanation begins with the observation that the quota is effectively a
tax. To the extent that the quota is collected in-kind, there is also the potential for this
tax to impose a large excess burden through its effect on farm behavior. It may distort
a household’s crop choice away from proﬁt maximization. Moreover, in the presence of
opportunities for off-farm labor, an in-kind quota may compel households to over-supply
agricultural labor relative to the proﬁt maximizing level.
In this situation, the Efﬁciency Hypothesis requires that village land reallocations be
conducted to reduce the excess burden of quotas. This has two implications. First, in
order to reduce the excess burden of the quota, we should see widespread willingness
to accept cash payments in lieu of in-kind quota payments. Of the villages surveyed, 10
percent allowed cash payment of quotas at the inception of HRS, while 58 percent allowed
cash payment of the quota in 1995.
The second implication is more subtle. In the presence of off-farm opportunities,
in-kind quotas may distort a household’s labor supply behavior by compelling them to
supply “too much" labor to agriculture. However, this distortion will only affect those
households that actually have opportunities to work off-farm. Our data suggest that
well under ﬁfty percent of households have such opportunities. This means that labor
supply distortions caused by in-kind quotas can increase the gains from land exchange.
Households whose agricultural labor supply is distorted by the in-kind quota should be
willing to give up some of their land in order to relieve their quota obligation and free up
labor for the off-farm market.11 In contrast, households whose agricultural labor supply
is not distorted by the in-kind quota have a comparative advantage in producing crops to
ﬁll the quota, and should be willing to take on larger quotas in return for more land.
Therefore, all else equal, we expect that: Villages with higher quotas will reallocate
more land (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 8); the effect of quotas on reallocation will be greater
in villages with higher off-farm wages (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 9); and these effects will be
present chieﬂy in those villages where quotas can only be paid in-kind. Alternatively, the
“right" to pay quotas in cash should help to attenuate the effect of quotas on reallocation
behavior (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 10).
c. Efﬁciency hypothesis: Rental and Reallocation
The foundation of the Efﬁciency Hypothesis is that administrative reallocations serve
to move land to higher valued uses. While much of the analysis proceeds under the
stylization that rental markets do not function at all, in fact, they operate at very low
levels. It is axiomatic that such market exchange of land serves to move land from lower
to higher-valued uses. Given this, if reallocations move land to higher valued use, then
we should expect to see that: Rental and administrative reallocation of land are substitutes
(Efﬁciency Hypothesis 11).
B. Equity hypothesis
Beyond efﬁciency, leaders may also reallocate land to increase equity within the village. In
the same way that the Efﬁciency Hypothesis rests on the possibility that some inﬂuential
11Given the possibility of imperfections in local food markets, a household may still want to retain some
of their land.
8coalition in the village seeks to the maximize income generated by agriculture, the Equity
Hypothesis rests on the possibility that some coalition in the village has a preference for
equity.
The generic success of microeconomic models taking self-interested behavior as axio-
matic makes the equity hypothesis less appealing. However, the equity hypothesis is still
deserving of serious consideration. First, by law, land ownership in rural China resides
with the village. Villagers and leaders sometimes interpret this as meaning that every
individual in the village is entitled to equal access to the land. Second, the legacy of 30
years of socialism may also have generated a preference for equity. Finally, the equity
hypothesis has been prominent in the literature [e.g. BURGESS, 1997; KUNG, 1995]. These
papers provide support for the notion that sufﬁciently inﬂuential coalitions with a prefer-
ence for equity may have been successful in lobbying for equitable land reallocations.
Deriving testable implications of the Equity Hypothesis requires us to spell out more
carefullywhatismeantbyequity. Deﬁningequity, however, isdifﬁcultsincethedeﬁnition
of an “increase in equity” is something over which reasonable people (our villagers in-
cluded) could easily disagree. Increases in equity could mean decreases in the dispersion
of wage rates, income, wealth, or landholdings. To compound this problem, an “increase
in equity” could also refer to decreases in the variation of opportunities to earn income or
acquire wealth and land holdings. This multiplicity of deﬁnitions makes testing the equity
hypothesis problematic.
Of the many possible deﬁnitions of equity, equal household per capita land holdings,
with possible adjustments for demographic characteristics, has special appeal. Such rules
were prominent with the introduction of the HRS in the early 1980s, while BURGESS [1997]
ﬁnds that land allocations in Sichuan and Jiangsu provinces in the late 1980s continued
to be consistent with such a simple demographic rule. We will call this sort of equity
simple demographic rules equity, and examine the hypothesis that land reallocations serve to
increase village conformance with this notion of equity.
We now state the Equity Hypothesis more formally: Costly land reallocations are
conducted to minimis the discounted present value of the disutility of deviations from the
land reallocation that perfectly satisﬁes simple demographic rules. Given this formula-
tion, pursuing equity results in a path similar to the one implied by the proﬁt maximizing
village government. Reallocations occur only when inequality-increasing movement in
household demographics grows sufﬁciently large that villager distaste for the inequality
justiﬁes the cost of conducting a reallocation. This implies that leaders reallocate land
more frequently the greater the shifts in household demographics (Equity Hypothesis).
The effect of transactions cost variables on the size and timing of reallocations under the
Equity Hypothesis is analogous to their effect under the Efﬁciency Hypothesis.
Note that both the Equity Hypothesis and Efﬁciency Hypothesis 3 predict that real-
location behavior depends upon changes in household demographics, while only the
Efﬁciency Hypothesis predicts that reallocation behavior depends upon changes in house-
hold labor supply. Therefore, a ﬁnding that reallocation behavior depends on changes in
labor supply is evidence for the Efﬁciency Hypothesis, but not the Equity Hypothesis.
However, if we ﬁnd that changes in household demographics affect reallocation behavior,
we have evidence for either hypothesis. Therefore, our data do not allow us to test the
two hypotheses against each other. However, the data do allow us to put bounds on the
relative economic importance (however measured) of the two hypotheses. The economic
importance of the Equity Hypothesis is bounded below by zero and above by the entire
9effect of demographic changes on reallocation behavior. The economic importance of the
Efﬁciency Hypothesis is bounded below by the effect of changes in labor supply behavior
on reallocations, and above by the total effect of labor supply and demographic changes.
C. Rent-seeking Behavior
For a majority of villages the “rent” associated with the allocation of use rights to land is
positive.12 Thus, village leaders may use their discretionary power to reallocate land as a
way of extracting some of these rents from households. Such rent extraction could come
in the form of explicit side payments or in a more intangible form (such as cooperation in
other aspects of village political and economic life, e.g., a vote, effort in helping execute
policy duties, etc.)
In pursuit of their own interests, village leaders could also take actions to try to limit
the factors that constrain their ability to earn these rents. Speciﬁcally, since rental markets
facilitate exchange among those with land and those who demand it (and thereby reduce
the land rents associated with reallocations), leaders have an incentive to try to minimize
the extent of rental markets. In fact, the absence of land rental markets in much of rural
China is otherwise difﬁcult to explain. It does not seem likely that the absence of land
markets results from the lack of formal or informal institutions (like courts) to support ex-
change; many other markets, such as agricultural commodity and off-farm labor markets,
ﬂourish in the same environment. It also does not seem to be the case that there are no
gains from exchange. BENJAMIN AND BRANDT [2002] ﬁnd evidence that farmers within a
village could gain considerably by renting land among themselves.
The failure of land markets due to the actions of self-interested leaders is broadly con-
sistent with observation. Conversations in the ﬁeld suggest that village leaders often have
the authority to permit or prevent land transactions and that they occasionally exercise
this authority. Researchers have documented "use it or lose it" rules under which land
that is rented out risks being lost in the subsequent reallocation [ROZELLE AND LI, 1998].
Furthermore, it is a well-established fact, that to the extent that the institutional envir-
onment provides individuals with the opportunity, ofﬁce holders often use the authority
of their ofﬁce for their own beneﬁt. Following such logic, we therefore expect that village
leadersinruralChinawillengageinrent-seekingbehaviortotheextentthatsuchbehavior
is tolerated. Rent seeking by village leaders could, therefore, be partly responsible for the
absence of land markets.
Our data provide the basis for two testable hypotheses that involve quota manage-
ment and land reallocation. First, the correlation between the size of the quota and land
reallocations (or the absence of land rental markets) may be used as a direct test of rent
seeking. Arguably, village leaders are the only people in the village with a direct interest
in seeing quotas fulﬁlled. A village leader’s salary and advancement both depend upon
quota fulﬁllment. In contrast, the quota is a tax on villagers and they would be better
off if it were not collected. Since collecting agricultural quotas involves, quite literally, a
collection of a share of agricultural land rents, then higher quotas should cause leaders to
reallocate more land insofar as some of these rents come back to them.
12We deﬁne the rent to be revenue earned from the land minus all costs, including taxes and the oppor-
tunity cost of labor.
10SuchadirectrelationshipbetweenquotasandreallocationsisalsoimpliedbyEfﬁciency
Hypothesis 8. Therefore, we cannot distinguish between the Rent-seeking and Efﬁciency
Hypotheses by examining only the relationship between quotas and land reallocations.
However, we can distinguish rent seeking from efﬁciency explanations for the role of
quotas if we also look at the relationship between quota levels and activity in the land
rental market. A leader using reallocations to collect land rents has an incentive to sup-
press market-based land exchanges because of the potential difﬁculties that third parties
pose for quota liability and collection. In contrast, if reallocations are conducted to in-
creaseefﬁciency, thenaleadershouldencourageefﬁciency-improvingmarkettransactions
in the presence of quota-induced labor supply distortions. Hence, our hypothesis is that,
if the impetus for reallocations comes from rent seeking leaders, then higher quotas are
associated with more land reallocation and less land rental market activity (Rent-seeking
Hypothesis 1).
Second, our data also provide us with an indirect way to test the rent-seeking hypo-
thesis. For many of our villages we know whether the most recent election for village
leader was contested or not. If we accept that villagers in communities that hold contested
elections are better able to control rent seeking by their leaders, we expect this to be
reﬂected in the mechanisms allocating land: In villages that elect their leaders through
contested elections, there should be less administrative reallocation and more market-
based land rental transactions (Rent-seeking Hypothesis 2).13
4. Description of data and variable construction
Our data are the product of a collaborative survey effort undertaken in 215 villages in
1996 and 1997. The survey covers 8 provinces: Zhejiang, Sichuan, Shanxi, Hubei, Hunan,
Hebei, Liaoning, and Yunnan. Thirty-two villages were sampled in each province, except
for Yunnan (24 villages), Hebei (15) and Liaoning (16). Enumerators used pre-coded
survey instruments as the basis for interviewing the village leader, party secretary and
accountant in each village. The sample of villages was constructed to provide a repres-
entative cross-section of villages in each province; the eight provinces represent the major
regions of China.
Our survey was designed to collect data on the emergence of major input and output
markets in rural China. In particular, blocks of the survey asked village leaders for inform-
ation on village land management practices, land rental market activity, household and
village demographics, off-farm labor market activity, agricultural production practices,
the characteristics of the village’s land that may affect the difﬁculty of conducting land
reallocations (or proxies of transaction costs), quotas, and other village characteristics.
For most variables, enumerators elicited information for 1995, 1988 and the year when
HRS was implemented in their villages, i.e. a year between 1980 and 1984. All variables
13While we believe that the most compelling interpretation for a negative (positive) correlation between
contested elections and land reallocations (market-based land rental transactions) is that the contested
election is acting as a check on rent seeking, econometric problems and the aggregate nature of our data
suggest caution. The presence of competitive elections is arguably endogenous and dependent on the
level of rent-seeking behavior. Also, other stories are consistent with this ﬁnding, e.g., elections may
systematically bias the behavior of government in favor of households that do not prefer reallocations.
11used in the subsequent econometric exercises are generated from this survey. Means and
standard deviations for the variables are reported in Table 8.
We ﬁrst construct three measures of the village leader’s land reallocation behavior,
our dependent variables. The ﬁrst of these, number of reallocations, is a simple count of
the number of times that villages have carried out village-wide reallocations since HRS.
Second, we construct a variable that is the number of years between the most recent
reallocation and the previous one, duration.14 Finally, we calculate, reallocation amount,
which is the percentage of total cultivated land that was reallocated during the most
recent reallocation. We also compute a measure of market-based land rental transactions
by dividing the total amount of land that is rented out by households by total cultivated
land.
We use information on the village’s population and labor market activity to obtain sev-
eral measures of changes in village demographics and off-farm labor supply. To describe
the construction of these variables, let N be the number of households in a village, and
let lt







denotes a vector describing the population or off-farm labor force







at time t + 1. An intuitive index of changes in household size (labor supply) is the sum
of the absolute change in household size (labor supply) in a village normalized by total
















However, we only have village-level data and so cannot construct these measures. Instead


































This expression is a lower bound for 1 and we use it as a measure of the extent of house-
hold changes in population or labor supply. Annual rates of change, rl, that correspond to






















Using 3 we construct an index of village changes in household demographics and three
indices of village changes in its off-farm labor force. In particular, the population index is
the annual rate of change in the number of people ofﬁcially registered as village residents.
We limit the population to village residents since these are the only individuals that are
entitled to consideration in the village’s land allocation process. The off-farm labor index is
14For those villages that have only reallocated once, the previous reallocation would be the allocation that
occurred with HRS.
12the annual rate of change in the total number of villagers that work off farm. We divide the
individuals working off the farm into two sub-groups. The local off-farm labor index is the
annual rate of change in the number of villagers that are employed locally off-farm. The
migrant off-farm labor index, on the other hand, is the annual rate of change in the number
of villagers that are employed off-farm and work and live most of the year outside of the
village.
To control for differences across villages in agricultural technology, we utilize inform-
ation on the each village’s average land-labor ratio. Given a constant returns to scale agri-
cultural technology, this ratio is identically equal to the ratio −Fxl/Fxx.15 We calculate the
land-labor ratio by dividing the total amount of cultivated land by the village population.
We use 1988 estimates of the population and land in cultivation, values of which predate
most of the reallocations that we seek to explain.
We also use our data to provide several measures of the costs of conducting admin-
istrative reallocations. The Multiple Cropping Index–MCI is the average number of crops
planted per plot in a year for each village. Administrative reallocations are more likely
to cause costly disruptions to farming as the number of crops per year increases. As the
number of households in a village increases, so does the complexity of conducting a realloca-
tion and so we expect transactions costs to rise with the number of households. Similarly,
as the number of plots per household increases reallocations become more complex and the
cost of a reallocation should rise. In contrast, the costs of carrying out reallocations should
fall as the number of cadres in the village rises. We also expect that the costs of conducting
a reallocation will be correlated with the number of small groups in a village.16
Since land reallocations may decrease the incentive for individuals to invest in agricul-
ture, thedisincentiveshouldbeconsideredasacostofreallocation. Hence, foreachvillage
we want a variable that measures the stock of agricultural investment that may be at risk
if tenure is insecure. Since paddy land requires signiﬁcant ongoing investment, we use
the proportion of rice paddy land as a measure of the importance of agricultural investment
in each village.
Our data also include information that we can use to construct measures of the im-
portance of the mandatory delivery quota in the village. Although ofﬁcials assign quotas
for grain, cotton and oil seed crops, the grain quota in most villages is by far the most
important. Since we do not have complete data on the quotas for cotton and oil seed crops,
we limit ourselves to grain. For each village, we know the volume of the community’s
grain quota in 1988 (measured in kilograms). The measure we use normalizes the quota
volume by a village’s 1988 total grain output. We also know for each village whether the
households in a village can fulﬁll their quota obligation with an equivalent cash payment.
Our measure, cash, is deﬁned as the percentage of households in each village that elected
cash rather than in-kind payment.
15We experimented with measures of output per unit of land, however, it was consistently out-performed
by the land-labor ratio.
16Prior to the HRS, households were organized into production teams. Their current counterpart is the
small group (xiao zu). These teams frequently are responsible for reallocating land among members during
village reallocations. In most villages, land is ﬁxed within these groups, though some reallocation may occur
between teams. While we cannot say with any conﬁdence whether transactions costs increase or decrease
with the number of small groups, we do expect heterogeneity in administrative structures to give rise to
heterogeneity in reallocation costs.
13For testing the Rent-seeking Hypothesis, we use data from our survey’s section on
village governance. We construct a contested election indicator variable that is coded one
if the village’s most recent election was contested and zero if not. From our interviews
with village leaders, we also know if the township government rather than village leaders
reserves the right to make decisions about land reallocations. We construct a dummy
variable township decides that is coded one when reallocation authority resides with the
township.
Finally, we have a series of other control variables. Our survey records the total number
of days that labor was hired-in for agriculture in each village. We do not have information
on total labor supply to agriculture, and so construct a dummy variable that simply
captures if farm labor is hired-in the village in 1988. We also have estimates of per capita
incomeforeachvillagefor1988andthedistancetothecountyseatfromthevillage(measured
in kilometers). Distance should be correlated with a number of factors that may affect
reallocation behavior, among them, access to off-farm employment (positively) and the
ability of the county to enforce central government reallocation policies in the village
(negatively). Villages located nearer to county seats may also face more pressures to
convert land to non-agricultural uses, which might precipitate village-wide reallocation.
Hence, it is difﬁcult to say, a priori, which effect will predominate.
5. Econometric model
Our econometric inquiry is in four basic parts. First, we analyze the number of village
reallocations since HRS. Since tenure security depends upon both the frequency of real-
locations and their size, we then analyze the duration of the most recent reallocation
cycle and the amount of land reallocated at the most recent reallocation. In doing so, we
address a number of potentially important econometric issues that may bias our results.
Third, we compare the determinants of market and administrative reallocations in order
to provide an assessment of the potential role of leader rent-seeking in explaining the
preference for administrative allocation. Finally, we examine the economic (as opposed
to statistical) importance of different variables in the amount and duration regressions in
order to quantify the role of equity versus efﬁciency considerations.
Table 3 about here
A. Number of reallocations
In any given year, we know the time since each village last reallocated its land. In
principle, these data on reallocation periods in progress could generate a great deal of
insight into reallocation behavior. Unfortunately these data are subject to two sampling
problems: Interruption bias and length-based oversampling.17
17Interruption bias occurs because we observe interrupted reallocation periods, which are shorter than
completed periods. To understand length-based over-sampling, imagine that all villages are identical, and
that each draws reallocation periods from a Bernoulli density which takes the values one day or 20 years
with equal probability. Despite the fact that reallocation periods of one day and twenty years are equally
likely, a cross-section of periods in progress over-samples long periods.
14SALANT [1977] proposes a method for dealing with these two problems, however this
method relies on identifying assumptions that do not hold for our data. While we cannot
use Salant’s method to examine our periods in progress data, we can use a simpler method
that has much the same spirit. If the number of times that a village reallocates during our
15-year window provides us with information about the distribution from which villages
draw hazard rates, then an attempt to explain the number of reallocations will provide
some insight into the distribution of village hazard rates.
Table 3 reports the results of regressions to explain the number of village-wide realloca-
tions since HRS as a function of changes in household demographics and labor supply, vil-
lage quotas, technology, transactions costs, and village governance. All of the regressions
include village income as an additional control variable. In column 1, our labor supply
variable is the rate of change in total off-farm labor. In column 2, and in subsequent
columns, we decompose off-farm labor into its two components, local and migrant. In
order to check the robustness of these results, we conduct several related estimations.
Column 3 reports the coefﬁcients of a Probit explaining a dummy variable that is 1 if a
village reallocated atleast once since HRS was introduced. Column 4 reports coefﬁcients of
the corresponding OLS regression. The results of the Probit and OLS regressions are similar
to the number regressions in columns 1 and 2, though levels of signiﬁcance are generally
lower. Column 5 presents the results of the corresponding Tobit regression, which corrects
for any censoring at zero. The results of the Tobit regression are qualitatively the same as
the OLS regression, but the coefﬁcients tend to be slightly larger. Given that the Probit and
OLS regressions “throw away” observed variance in the dependent variable, the following
discussion focuses primarily on the number regression and the Tobit.
As predicted by Efﬁciency Hypothesis 3 and the Equity Hypotheses, the number of
reallocations depends on the rate of change of population. Reallocation behavior is also
sensitive to the rate of change of off-farm opportunities, however, the sign of this effect is
opposite that of population change. We also ﬁnd that villages located nearer to the county
seat tend to reallocate more. One interpretation consistent with this behavior is that the
variable is picking up unobserved changes in off-farm opportunities.18
To examine the role of off-farm labor further, we decompose the variable into its local
and migrant components. Villages experiencing greater changes in migrant off-farm
employment reallocate more times, however, villages reallocate less frequently as local
off-farm opportunities change faster. Both effects are statistically signiﬁcant. The opposite
signs on the two off-farm labor variables are difﬁcult to explain as a consequence of the
Efﬁciency Hypothesis. From the point of view of a maximizing household, the only
difference between the local and migrant off-farm opportunities is that labor supplied to
the latter probably must be done so in much larger blocks than the other. It is not obvious
why the “lumpiness" of migrant employment should be important. On the other hand, the
opposite effects of the two types of off-farm labor on the frequency of reallocation may be
evidence in favor of interest group politics.19 We note that the opposite signs on the two
labor variables do not persist in later regressions that examine the size of reallocations.
18An alternative possibility is that it is picking up returns to converting land to non-agricultural uses
(which would then necessitate land reallocations).
19Villagers who work outside the village leave land behind unfarmed (or under-farmed), and are not
present to lobby for their continued tenure. Consequently, high frequency of reallocation associated with
high rates of out-migration may reﬂect pressures to redistribute to those who live in the village from those
who leave.
15Quota levels are also positively and signiﬁcantly related to the frequency of realloca-
tions, which is consistent with both Efﬁciency Hypothesis 8 and Rent-seeking Hypothesis
1.20 As the level of agricultural quota in the village increases, the number of reallocations
increases. This effect is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. On the other hand,
there are fewer reallocations in villages where decisions about reallocations are made by
the township. This result, which is especially pronounced in the Probit and Tobit models,
suggests that townships are helping to enforce the ﬁfteen year tenure security provision
of the HRS law, and thus restrict rent-seeking behavior.
Transactions costs also appear to play a prominent role (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 2). Vil-
lages reallocate fewer times as the number of plots per household and the number of
households in the village rise. The intensity of cultivation as measured by the multiple
cropping index, however, does not affect the number of reallocations, but does have a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood of reallocation since HRS. Vil-
lages reallocate more frequently as the number of “small groups” and cadres in the village
increase, though the effect of the number of cadres is statistically insigniﬁcant. Finally,
as the percentage of cultivated area in rice paddy in the village increases, the number
of reallocations decreases. Since rice paddy land requires more ongoing investment for
maintenance, this may indicate that reallocation behavior is sensitive to the importance of
investment in agriculture.
Finally, we ﬁnd that reallocations are more frequent as the land-labor ratio increases,
and that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant. That the agricultural technology affects
reallocation behavior is an implication of Efﬁciency Hypothesis 4.
In summary, the “count" regressions reported in Table 3 show that village reallocation
behavior is responsive to demographic and labor supply variables, to quota levels, the
costs of reallocation, and the role of townships in village land policy.
B. Duration and amounts
a. Econometric issues
In 1994 and 1995 we observe 51 of the 215 villages reallocate land. For villages that
reallocate, we observe the proportion of land that changes hands and the time since the





and 164 villages with reallocation periods in progress for which S = 0. We describe these
data with a three equation model: 4 explains the amount reallocated; 5 explains the time
since the last reallocation; and 6 explains whether or not we observe a reallocation in 1994
or 1995:
Sj = A0xj + A1τj + µj, (4)








j = C0xj + C1zj + δj,
20Quota interaction terms discussed earlier are not included because these variables vary within villages
over the study period.
16where we observe Sj and τj only if Ij = 1 and I∗
j is a latent variable. The third equation
allows us to account for selection into the sample of villages which reallocate, but does
not make use of the biased length data for periods in progress. This model provides an ac-
curate description of the data, and since it does not use information on the length of spells
in progress, avoids the intractable problem of correcting for length biased oversampling
and interruption bias.
To estimate the system we must deal with three econometric problems: (1) error terms
in the amount and duration equations may be correlated; (2) there may be selection bias:
values of unobserved variables may differ between villages that reallocate and those that
don’t; and (3) the zi variables that occur in 5 but not in 4 may, in fact belong in 5 as well.
We begin by estimating the model for a basic set of explanatory variables in order to assess
the importance of these problems.
We ﬁrst estimate the amount and duration equation with OLS. Provided that selection
and endogeneity are not problems, these estimations generate consistent coefﬁcient es-
timates. We next use predicted values of τ instead of actual values in the OLS amount
regression to correct for possible correlation of ε and µ. Provided that E(zµ) = 0 and
there is no selection effect, the second stage OLS regression (or TSLS) provides consistent
estimates of all coefﬁcients.
We also conduct two exercises to check if our results are inﬂuenced by selection, i.e.,
E(µ|I = 1) 6= 0, or, E(ε|I = 1) 6= 0. First, we calculate the Heckman correction based
on a Probit estimation of 6. We then include this correction in the naive OLS regressions
for duration and amount. Since all variables in the duration regression are present in the
switchingequation, weareabletoidentifyparametersinthecorrecteddurationregression
only because of non-linearities in our estimate of E(ε|I = 1). Second, we test whether
our results are sensitive to selection bias using the procedure described in BAKER and
BENJAMIN [1997]. To conduct this sensitivity test, we ﬁrst use the naive OLS regressions
to impute amounts and durations to the 164 villages for which we do not observe a
reallocation in 1994-1995. By scaling all of the imputed estimates by a constant, we are
able to adjust implicitly the mean of the unobserved component. Reestimating the naive
regression on the full sample, and using the scaled, imputed values for villages which do
not reallocate, allows us to check whether our results are sensitive to selection bias. We
conduct these robustness tests by scaling imputed values up and down by 15 percent. If
our results are not sensitive to this sort of manipulation, then we can conclude that our
results are not sensitive to selection bias, even if such a bias exists.
Table 4 and 5 about here
Tables 4 and 5 report the regression results for the Duration and Amount regressions.
In column 1 of Tables 4 and 5, we report the OLS results for the basic version of the two
regressions. Column 6 of Table 5 reports TSLS estimates for the amounts regression. The
instruments that we use to predict years since the last reallocation are: All explanatory
variables in column 1 of Table 3, plus interaction terms involving the transactions cost
variables that appear in the duration, but not the amount regression.21 The coefﬁcient on
Time in the TSLS estimation is about twice as large as that obtained using OLS. This sug-
gests that the OLS coefﬁcient on years since the last reallocation may be biased downward.
21This instrument set passes the Hausman over-id test at the 5 percent level.
17However, theotherparameterestimatesaresimilarinthe OLS andthe TSLS. Consequently,
in several auxiliary versions of the Amount regression, we only report OLS estimations.
Inclusion of the Heckman correction in the basic model generates results indistinguish-
able from those obtained by OLS. This test, along with results obtained using the BAKER
AND BENJAMIN [1997] procedure suggest that selection bias is not important.
b. Duration and Amount results
Table 4 reports estimates of regressions explaining the duration of the most recent real-
location period. The regressions are similar in speciﬁcation to the number of reallocations
regressions (Table 3), although the level of signiﬁcance is considerably lower for some
variables. This result is not unexpected given the much smaller sample size. We ﬁnd
that the signs of the demographic and labor supply coefﬁcients are unchanged, although
only the rate of change of village population is statistically signiﬁcant. The years since
the last reallocation is also signiﬁcantly shorter in villages facing higher output quotas as
suggested by Rent-seeking Hypothesis 1 and Efﬁciency Hypothesis 8. Transactions costs
also matter. The number of households in the village and the average number of plots per
household remain signiﬁcant, with increases in either leading to increases in the expected
duration of a reallocation period. Finally, an increase in cropping intensity as captured by
the MCI also leads to an increase in expected duration.
The remainder of this section discusses the results of a number of different speciﬁca-
tions explaining the amount of land reallocated in the most recent reallocation.
The amount of land reallocated depends signiﬁcantly on the years since the last real-
location. The OLS (TSLS) coefﬁcient suggests that for each additional year since the last
reallocation, the amount of land reallocated increases by 3% (6%). This is consistent with
the Equity and Efﬁciency Hypothesis.
We ﬁnd that villages experiencing more rapid change in population reallocate a larger
percentage of land, which is consistent with either the Equity or Efﬁciency Hypothesis.
Consistent with Efﬁciency Hypothesis 3, both kinds of off-farm opportunity variables
have signiﬁcant, positive effects on the percentage of land reallocated.22
The discussion of quotas in section 3 provides two potential explanations (Efﬁciency
Hypothesis 8 and Rent-seeking Hypothesis 1) as to why the effect of quotas on realloc-
ations should increase with the amount of the quota. We ﬁnd a strong positive relation
between quotas and the size of the most recent reallocation. Efﬁciency Hypothesis 9 also
suggests that the effect of quotas on reallocation should be greater in areas where the
returns to off-farm labor are greater. In column 3 of Table 5, we include an interaction
term between quotas and the off-farm wage in the basic amount regression. Quotas alone
become insigniﬁcant, while the interaction term is positive and highly signiﬁcant. Larger
reallocations are found where the excess burden of the quotas is likely to be larger.
The discussion of quota fulﬁllment in section 3.1 also predicts that villages will look
for ways to eliminate the deadweight loss associated with binding agricultural quotas
(Efﬁciency Hypothesis 10). One way to do this is to allow quotas to be fulﬁlled in cash.
In column 4, we include an interaction term involving quotas and the percentage of
households paying their quotas in cash. Quotas continue to have an independent effect,
22In Table 6, we aggregate off-farm opportunities into a single variable. This economizes on degrees of
freedom and facilitates exposition of interaction effects.
18but the interaction term is negative, and highly signiﬁcant. For every ten percentage point
increase in the number of households paying their quota in cash, the amount of land
reallocated falls by six percent. Finally, in column 5 we include both of the interaction
terms involving quotas. The coefﬁcients and the t-statistics on the interaction terms are
slightly smaller than when the interaction terms are included separately, but both effects
remain important. These regressions provide strong support for the role of reallocations
in reducing the deadweight loss associated with quota fulﬁllment.
The Efﬁciency Hypothesis predicts that the size of the reallocation depends on the
production technology as proxied by the land-labor ratio. The amount of land reallocated
is positively related to the land-labor ratio: Areas with higher land-labor ratios reallocate
more land. We also interact the land-labor ratio with the change in off-farm opportunities,
and ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The results are consistent with
Efﬁciency Hypotheses 4 and 5.
We ﬁnd that two of the transactions costs variables affect the amount of land realloc-
ated: Amounts reallocated decrease with the average number of plots per households
and the percentage of rice paddy land. Apart from the possibility that reallocating paddy
land reduces investment, the well-deﬁned perimeter of a paddy ﬁeld increases the cost
of sub-division relative to that on non-paddy. All other transaction costs variables affect
amounts reallocated only through their effects on durations. Note that this is the pre-
diction of Efﬁciency Hypothesis 6: Some transaction costs variables only affect duration
while others affect duration and amount.
A central tenet of the Efﬁciency Hypothesis is that administrative reallocations and
markets are substitutes (Efﬁciency Hypothesis 11). Column 2 of Table 5 includes two
measures of market activity as explanatory variables in the amount regression. The
percentage of land rented is highly signiﬁcant and negative: A one percent increase in
the amount of land rented is associated with a 1.4 percent decrease in the amount real-
located. This is consistent with market and administrative reallocations being substitute
mechanisms for moving land to higher valued uses. The coefﬁcient on a dummy variable
indicating whether farm labor was hired in the village also suggests that less land is real-
located in villages in which farm labor is hired, however, the effect is not signiﬁcant. The
lack of precision in our ability to estimate this effect is not surprising given the crudeness
with which this variable measures labor market activity.
To assess the importance of rent seeking by village leaders, we include a dummy that
is coded 1 if the village experienced a contested election (more than one candidate) in the
year of the reallocation, or the year before. (See column 3, Table 5 and column 1, Table 6).
A contested election signiﬁcantly reduced the time since the last reallocation, however, it
also signiﬁcantly reduced the size of the reallocation. On net, contested elections lead to
more secure tenure,23 which is consistent with Rent-seeking Hypothesis 2.
c. Reallocation Amounts, Rental and Rent-seeking
Regressions for land rental reported in columns 2-5 of Table 6 for the same subset of
villages as used in Table 5 help corroborate a role of leader rent-seeking behavior. These
23A contested election reduced the time between reallocations by about two years, or a reduction in the
time between reallocations of thirty percent. On average, reallocations occur every six years. On the other
hand, a contested election cut in half the amount of land reallocated.
19regressions are similar to those for the amount of land reallocated, except that the in-
dependent variable is now the amount of land rented out.24 Since we are interested
in explaining differences that can be linked to differences in village characteristics, the
percentage of land rented-out is a better measure of land rental. Because only 30 of the 48
villages report any rental transactions at all, we report both Tobit and OLS speciﬁcations.
The transactions costs variables are omitted from the rental regressions because they are
intended to reﬂect costs of administrative rather then rental transactions. The income
variable has no explanatory power, and is dropped as well, without any effect on the
remaining parameter estimates. We also allow local and non-local off-farm opportunities
to have different effects.
Table 6 about here
The results of these regressions should be regarded as preliminary for two reasons.
First, the sample size is quite small. Second, we expect that rental and administrative
land reallocations are simultaneously determined. Enlarging our data set is infeasible,
however, we could estimate a simultaneous system for rental and land reallocation. The
difﬁculty lies in coming up with a plausible set of instruments to identify the system at the
village level. Ideally, we need variables that will inﬂuence the amount of administrative
reallocation, but not rental.
With these caveats in place, the results of these regressions are striking. Like adminis-
trative reallocations, the amount of rental responds positively to increases in both types
of off-farm labor supply, and to the agricultural technology variables. This is consistent
with our earlier ﬁnding that rental and administrative reallocations are substitutes. Note
that migrant off-farm opportunities have a larger effect on land rental. One interpretation
for this result is that local off-farm opportunities have a much smaller effect on household
farm labor supply. Individuals working off-farm locally can still work their plots.
We also ﬁnd that rental and administrative reallocations respond in opposite ways to
increases in quotas and to the presence of contested elections (Rent-seeking Hypothesis
2). Where administrative reallocation increases with quotas, rental transactions decrease;
moreover, where administrative reallocation decreases with contested elections, rental
transactions increase. In villages with contested election, the percentage of land that was
reallocated during the most recent reallocation fell by thirty percent; the percentage of
land that was rented out, on the other hand, nearly doubled. This suggests that insti-
tutions that increase the ability of villagers to turn out leaders seen as being narrowly
rent-seeking will increase the reliance on market land exchange. Similarly, as quotas
decrease, and the amount of rent which leaders must extract from the village on behalf
of the state decreases, the reliance on market land transactions is also likely to increase.
d. Assessing economic signiﬁcance
Thus far we have concentrated on determining the statistical signiﬁcance of relationships
between reallocation behavior and various explanatory variables. Table 7 provides a basis
for assessing the economic signiﬁcance of these variables, and the role of efﬁciency versus
equity considerations.
24Land rented-out is preferred to land rented-in because the latter may be inﬂuenced by land policies in
neighboring villages.
20Table 7 about here
The ﬁrst column of Table 7 indicates the percentage change in the duration of the
most recent reallocation period that results from a one standard deviation change in an
independent variable. This is calculated by multiplying the regression coefﬁcients of the
duration regression in column 1 of Table 4 by the standard deviation of the variable and
then dividing by the mean duration of a reallocation cycle. Thus, for example, a one stand-
ard deviation change in the rate of change of population results in a 16 percent decrease
in the duration of a reallocation cycle.25 The second column indicates the percentage
change in the amount reallocated due to a one standard deviation change in each of the
same independent variables. We ﬁnd that changes in population, quotas and transactions
costs have the largest effects on the duration, while changes in off-farm opportunities and
village income have the most pronounced effects on the size of the reallocations.
Our estimates in column 2 of the effect of the independent variables on the amount
reallocated ignore the effect of these variables on the amount reallocated that operates
through their effect on the time since the last reallocation or duration. Column 3 of Table
7 incorporates this effect into our calculation. Column 3 gives the total effect of a one
standard deviation change in an explanatory variable on the annual percentage of land
reallocated. Quotas and income are especially important, followed by changes in off-farm
opportunities, the demographic changes, and ﬁnally the transactions costs.
In summary, reallocations are most affected by the importance of quota fulﬁllment,
followed by inefﬁciency in land allocation and the desire to maintain equity. Recall that
the effect of changes in household demographics is attributable to both an equity and
efﬁciency motive. High transactions cost, on the other hand, inhibit reallocation.
6. Conclusion
Since the introduction of the HRS in the early 1980s, much of the farm land in rural China
has been reallocated by local governments. This has occurred despite government policy
guaranteeing farm households the right of secure tenure for 15 years.
We consider three explanations of the land reallocation behavior of village govern-
ments. The Efﬁciency Hypothesis posits that local governments act to maximize the
income generated by agriculture. We ﬁnd support for this hypothesis on several fronts.
First, land reallocation increases in villages where it is more important to reduce the excess
burden associated with agricultural quotas. We also ﬁnd that reallocation behavior re-
sponds to changes in household demographics, off-farm labor supply, and to interactions
of the latter with variables describing the agricultural technology, tempered by the costs
of carrying out reallocations. Evidence for the importance of efﬁciency considerations is
buttressed by the fact that rental and administrative reallocation appear to be substitutes.
Thatis, aspredictedbytheEfﬁciencyHypothesis, administrativeandmarketreallocations
both move land to higher valued uses.
The responsiveness of reallocation behavior to changes in population, while consistent
with the Efﬁciency Hypothesis (since population and labor supply are closely linked)
25 To facilitate comparison of results on duration and amount, the change In duration due to the change
in off-farm labor that we report is the sum of the individual values for off-farm migrant and non-migrant
labor.
21is also consistent with an Equity Hypothesis, i.e., that reallocation behavior serves to
promoteequalpercapitaaccesstoland. However, ourempiricalassessmentoftherelative
importance of the alternative interpretations suggest that the Equity Hypothesis is prob-
ably not important economically. Even if we attribute all of the effect of population change
to communal concerns for equity, our ﬁndings indicate that administrative reallocations
are less sensitive to changes in this variable than to variables which reﬂect the importance
of other motivations for reallocation.
While efﬁciency concerns are important, we ﬁnd preliminary evidence supporting
the view that reallocation is motivated by village leaders’ own efforts at rent seeking.
In villages with contested elections, where villagers are better able to call their leaders
to account, there is less reallocation. Correspondingly, we also ﬁnd that the effects of
contested elections (as well as quotas) on market activity are opposite of their effect on
reallocation behavior. This is consistent with the view that village leader behavior may be
a source of the failure of land rental markets to develop more fully. In future work, we
plan to examine the interaction between administrative land reallocation and rental using
recently collected data.
In summary, our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the view that local governments
operate partially, but by no means entirely in the interests of their constituents, i.e. vil-
lagers. They also respond to interests of higher-level authorities, and their own self-
interests. As a result, our results suggest that policies that weaken the incentives for local
ofﬁcials to enforce quotas and which increase the integrity and prevalence of elections
will contribute to more secure land tenure and increased reliance on market exchange.
Since administrative reallocations leave signiﬁcant gains from trade unexploited, these
measures promise important welfare gains for China’s rural households.
Table 8 about here
7. Technical appendix: The Efﬁciency Hypothesis and changes in labor
supply
Formally, our hypothesis is that administrative land reallocations maximize the discoun-
ted present value of agricultural proﬁts, net of costs to conduct reallocations. Over time
households change their labor supply to agriculture in response to changes in their off-
farm opportunities and changes in household labor endowment. Since households cannot
adjust land holdings and hiring of agricultural labor is limited, agricultural land and
labor gradually become “less well matched” and a village’s agricultural proﬁts decline.
Reallocations correct this deterioration, but entail substantial transactions costs. As such,
they occur only when the land-labor match deteriorates sufﬁciently to warrant the cost.26
Consider a village with one unit of farm land divided between two households. Village
agricultural proﬁt in a given year is the sum of agricultural proﬁts in the two households.
Land and labor are perfectly matched, and village agricultural proﬁts are maximized when
26 We expect reallocation behavior will affect investment behavior, and perhaps that investments in land
affect tenure security. Since our data set contains very little information about household investments in
agriculture, we ignore investment decisions in the formal model.
22the marginal productivity of land is equal for both households. For a given initial alloc-
ation of land and labor, deﬁne the quality of the land-labor match to be the amount of land
that must be reallocated to achieve this optimum.
Let F denote the household farming technology and let xi, and li, denote land and
labor for household i. Suppose that in Year 1 land and labor are perfectly matched, but
that in Year 2 each household experiences a change in its agricultural labor supply. Since
agricultural labor and land markets do not function, these labor supply changes affect the
marginal productivity of land and open the door to gains from land reallocation. For a
given change in labor supply, the amount of land that must be reallocated to maximize
village proﬁts depends directly on Fxl, the sensitivity of the marginal product of land to
changes in labor supplies, and inversely on Fxx, the sensitivity of the marginal product
of land to changes in household land allocation. From this discussion we conclude that
the Efﬁciency Hypothesis implies that reallocation behavior depends on the technology,
changes in the labor supply, and the interaction of these two quantities.
Ifthemotivationforreallocationsistomaximizeagriculturalproﬁts, aslongasthereare
ﬁxedcostsofreallocatingland, itisnotoptimaltomaintainatalltimesaperfectland-labor
match. Instead, villages periodically reallocate land when the existing allocation is “far
enough”fromtheoptimum. Inordertoanalyzethisbehaviorwerequireadynamicmodel
of optimal land reallocation.
Let Π∗ denote the maximal agricultural proﬁts that can be obtained in any given year
and let S denote the quality of the land-labor match. Since the quality of the land-labor
match is deﬁned to be the amount of land that must be reallocated to return the village to
an instantaneous optimum, increases in S should be associated with decreases in agricul-
tural proﬁts. That is,
Π(S) = Π∗ − αS, (7)
where α = |ΠS| measures the sensitivity of proﬁts to changes in the land-labor match.
Earlier discussions suggest that this parameter will depend on characteristics of the ag-
ricultural technology. Let ν denote the rate at which the land-labor match deteriorates.
Our earlier discussion suggests that this deterioration is closely related to changes in
households’ labor supply behavior. We can now write the land-labor match as a linear
function of time, S(t0 + t) = S(t0) + νt. Substituting into 7 we have Π (S(t0 + t)) =
Π∗ − α(S(t0) + νt).
This expression reﬂects the following intuition: village agricultural proﬁts decrease
in the time since the last reallocation and in the rate at which the land-labor match
deteriorates. The rate at which the land-labor match deteriorates increases with the rate
at which labor supplies to agriculture change. The sensitivity of proﬁts to a given change
in the land-labor match depends on the shape of the underlying agricultural production
function.
The problem facing the village is to maximize the discounted present value of agricul-





e−rt (Π∗ − α(x + νt))dt − e−rτ  
cf + cv(x + ντ − y) + V(y)

. (8)
where cf is the ﬁxed cost of conducting a land reallocation, cv is the marginal cost of
reallocating a unit of land, r is the discount rate, τ is the time between reallocations, and t
the time since a reallocation.
23For any given initial state of the land-labor match, x, the village chooses the time until
the next reallocation, τ, and the amount of land reallocated at the next reallocation, (x +
ντ − y). Optimal reallocation behavior maximizes the discounted present value of the
present cycle’s proﬁts, conditional on optimizing behavior thereafter.
This statement of the problem makes the following implicit assumptions. (1) Villages
never make the choice “never reallocate”. While our sample contains some villages
that have not reallocated, we cannot distinguish the decision “never reallocate” from the
decision “reallocate less often than every 15 years”.27 Given this we opt for the simpler
statement of the problem. (2) Equation 8 restricts attention to discontinuous reallocation
behavior. In the presence of a discrete cost of reallocation, continuous reallocation cannot
be optimal if the response to reallocations is continuous. (3) Equation 8 does not consider
the case when the village’s initial need to reallocate land is larger than the threshold.
This is a simple extension of the analysis but is not indicated by the data, which suggest
that ﬁrst reallocations are like subsequent reallocations.28 (4) If the leader can anticipate
changes in households’ labor supplies, he might choose to reallocate more land than is
required to get to the optimum. Equation 8 does not allow this. This is a simplifying
assumption consistent with the leader having limited ability to predict the direction of
change in any given household’s labor supply.







e−rt (Π − α(x + νt))dt − e−rτ  
cf + cv(x + νt − y)

. (9)
That is, if we constrain all reallocation cycles to be of the same length, require each
reallocation to exhaust completely gains from trade, and for the initial state of the village
tobetheinstantaneousoptimum, thenY∗ isthebestwecando. Let τ∗ = τ∗  
Π,α,ν,cf,cv,r











where α − rcv > 0. That is, for any given starting value the optimal reallocation path
involves waiting until the village needs to reallocate a certain optimal amount of land,
τ∗ν , in order to return to the instantaneous optimum. When the village reaches this state,
it reallocates until the instantaneous optimum is achieved.
To verify that 10 is a solution to 8, substitute 10 into 8. Since this expression is an
identity when y = 0, and τ = τ∗ − x/ν, it is sufﬁcient to show that these two values
are optimizing. To do this take derivatives with respect to y, and τ. To verify that the τ
derivative is zero, differentiate 9 and substitute. To verify that the constraint y > 0 binds,
follow the same procedure. This analysis follows LUCAS and STOKEY [1989, p. 123].
Differentiating 10 with respect to τ gives:





This expression does not have an analytical solution for τ∗, however we can differentiate
implicitly. This yields two unambiguous comparative statics: dτ∗
dΠ = 0, and dτ∗
dcv > 0.
27The HRS was introduced in the early 1980’s, about 15 years before our 1996-7 surveys.
28We cannot reject the hypothesis that the average amount of land changing hands in a village’s ﬁrst
reallocation is the same as the average amount of land changing hands in subsequent reallocations.
24The reallocation path that maximizes the discounted present value of agricultural
proﬁts has the following characteristics. For a given initial value of the land-labor




, is reached and then reallocates land until S = 0. Thereafter, the
planner reallocates until S = 0 every τ∗ years. Hence a plot of the time path of village
proﬁts is a “sawtooth” pattern.
We note that if instantaneous proﬁts were concave in the amount of land reallocated,
e.g., Π (S) = Π∗ − αS2, then the amount of land reallocated could depend on variable
costs of reallocation, as could the upper and lower thresholds of the land-labor match. We
assume that instantaneous proﬁts are linear in the amount of land reallocated. Our data
provide no basis for estimating second order terms of the instantaneous proﬁt function.
An artifact of this assumption is that variable costs of reallocating do not affect the amount
of land reallocated, except by affecting the time between reallocations.29 In a more general
model variable costs may impact the amount of land reallocated directly, not just through
their impact on time between reallocations.
Although we cannot ﬁnd an analytical solution for τ∗, we can generate comparative
statics. Unexpectedly, the time between reallocations need not be decreasing in α, ν, and
cv. Two countervailing forces are at work here. First, the “continuation payoff”, i.e., the
maximum present value of proﬁts, conditional on a reallocation having just occurred,
declines as α increases. Since α measures the sensitivity of agricultural proﬁts to changes
in the land-labor match, as α increases, the village must reallocate more often to maintain
the same average proﬁts. Consequently, either the average proﬁts decline or expenditure
on reallocations increases. In either event the continuation payoff declines. Therefore, as
α increases, it becomes less costly to delay reallocating because the village delays a less
valuable future. On the other hand, as α increases, the marginal beneﬁt from reallocating
at any given time increases, since the village is further from the instantaneous optimum.
Hence, as α increases, delay is less costly and the beneﬁt of reallocation grows more
quickly. Since these two effects work in opposite directions, the net effect of a change
in α on τ∗ is ambiguous. Similar arguments explain why the effect of changes in cv and ν
on τ∗ are also ambiguous.
In summary, the Efﬁciency Hypothesis has the following implication for the behavior
of the observed time between reallocations: (1) the time between reallocations depends on
the rate at which household agricultural labor supplies change, the sensitivity of agricul-
tural productivity to land-labor mismatches, and the product of these two quantities; and
(2)Thetimebetweenreallocationsdependsonthemarginalandﬁxedcostsofreallocation.
In addition, the Efﬁciency Hypothesis has the following implication for the behavior of
the observed size of village land reallocations: (1) the size of a given reallocation increases
in the time since the last reallocation; (2) the size of a given reallocation increases with
the rate at which household agricultural labor supplies change; (3) the size of a given
reallocation depends on the sensitivity of agricultural proﬁts to land-labor mismatches,
and the product of this sensitivity with the rate of labor supply change; (4) the size of
a given reallocation depends on ﬁxed costs only indirectly, through their impact on the
timing of reallocations. In practice, this leads us to expect that some transactions costs
variables will inﬂuence time and size, while others will inﬂuence only time; and (5) the
size of a given reallocation depends on variable costs of reallocation.
29Barring a corner solution where the village never reallocates.
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